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The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration of Islamism
in the Sudan (Review)
Abstract
In this careful and engagingly written analysis of Hasan al-Turabi's decade in power, Abdullahi A. Gallab
concludes that the experience of Sudan during the "first Islamist republic" (1989-99) serves as a warning
against "ideological entrapments" (p. 167) of all kinds, and leads to the "realization that Islamism, like all other
isms, can be and should be contested" (p. ix). Drawing upon extensive interviews with Sudanese Islamists, as
well as upon Arabic and English studies, Gallab summarizes the Islamist experiment in dismal terms. He
variously calls it a "reign of terror," a "trauma," a source of "despair," "an open-ended system of oppression," the
product of a wide "range of deceits," a vehicle for the "violent suppression of other religious systems" and
political voices, and a "charade" (pp. 4, 15, 78, 137). In Gallab's account, Turabi emerges as a manipulator and
a megalomaniac (albeit a suave one) who entertained the creation of a "personality cult" (p. 112) around him.
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and most of all re-dreaming with/through our children new possibilities 
based on privileged hindsight.
TIBEBE ESHETE, Michigan State University
NOTE
 1. Maimire Mennasemay, “Towards a Critical Ethiopian Theory of Education,” 
in Education, Politics and Social Change in Ethiopia, ed. Paulos Milkias and 
Messay Kebede (Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishers, 2010).
The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration 
of Islamism in the Sudan, by Abdullahi A. Gallab
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008; pp. 194. $99.95 cloth.
In this careful and engagingly written analysis of Hasan al-Turabi’s 
decade in power, Abdullahi A. Gallab concludes that the experience of 
Sudan during the “ﬁrst Islamist republic” (1989–99) serves as a warning 
against “ideological entrapments” (p. 167) of all kinds, and leads to the 
“realization that Islamism, like all other isms, can be and should be 
contested” (p. ix). Drawing upon extensive interviews with Sudanese 
Islamists, as well as upon Arabic and English studies, Gallab summarizes 
the Islamist experiment in dismal terms. He variously calls it a “reign 
of terror,” a “trauma,” a source of “despair,” “an open-ended system of 
oppression,” the product of a wide “range of deceits,” a vehicle for the 
“violent suppression of other religious systems” and political voices, and 
a “charade” (pp. 4, 15, 78, 137). In Gallab’s account, Turabi emerges as 
a manipulator and a megalomaniac (albeit a suave one) who entertained 
the creation of a “personality cult” (p. 112) around him.
The title of this book, The First Islamist Republic, signiﬁes three 
things. It signiﬁes, ﬁrst, the decade of rule before General Umar Beshir 
pushed Turabi out of power, thereby revealing the rifts that had been 
deepening within the upper tiers of the regime and the Islamist move-
ment. Second, the title reﬂects the contention that this Islamist regime 
was the ﬁrst Sunni Islamist regime of its kind in the world. Unlike the 
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Shi’i Islamism of postrevolutionary Iran, which privileged ayatollahs 
and Muslim clerics, this Sudanese Sunni Islamism of the late twenti-
eth century favored and mobilized Western-educated intellectuals who 
regarded themselves as agents of Muslim modernity and who looked 
down on clerics as obstacles to progress. Finally, the title underlines the 
argument that this Islamist republic was something new in Sudanese 
history: it tried to harness political ideology to a kind of totalizing state 
control over culture and society that was unprecedented in its scope. The 
most salient features of the “ﬁrst Islamist republic” may have been its 
centralizing power, ruthless suppression of dissent, and ambition—but 
not its religious credentials per se.
With regard to Islamic credentials, Gallab argues that the regime 
failed to set a “moral standard” (p. 78) from the moment the dust settled 
after the 1989 coup. (Typical of this lack of integrity, Gallab believes, 
was the way Turabi dissimulated by denying any involvement in the 
1989 coup for a decade, only claiming to have played a leading role in its 
orchestration after his fall from power.) Where, then, was the Islam in this 
government’s Islamism? Rather than promoting the kind of commitment 
to political ethics, social justice, and civil liberties to which a Muslim 
humanitarian project might aspire, the regime focused on consolidating 
power, suppressing dissent, fomenting diversionary internal conﬂicts in 
the name of jihad, and making money. Gallab suggests that the Islamists 
capitalized on Islamic banking and developed corporate ties in ways that 
enabled them to amass wealth, and later to assert and tighten their politi-
cal grip. Meanwhile, the Islamist republic set about building its coercive 
apparatus, most egregiously by institutionalizing torture chambers known 
as ghost houses. Gallab writes, “If the concentration camps were the 
‘most consequential institutions’ of totalitarianism, as [Hannah] Arendt 
described them, the ghost houses—‘the dwelling of horrors’—would 
represent the core of this Sudanese regime’s totalitarianism” (p. 113).
In every “ism” is an element of idealism, and the Sudanese Islamist 
movement—like the Sudanese communist and early nationalist move-
ments before it—was no exception to this rule. That surely explains 
the deep sense of disappointment and bitterness that pervades this 
book. Gallab identiﬁes himself as an outsider to the Sudanese Islamist 
movement, but nevertheless conveys the disillusionment of the many 
former Turabi supporters, or Sudanese Islamists in the diaspora, whom 
he interviewed. Sudanese Islamists, at their most idealistic, may have 
Book Reviews n 155
believed that modern, institutionalized Islamic government would offer 
a cure for Sudan’s political ailments—the accumulation of ailments 
from the colonial and postcolonial periods. Turabi’s regime dashed 
those hopes.
By 1999, the Sudanese Islamist movement, as Gallab presents it, 
had two other notable features. First, it was a very elite movement, and 
to the extent that it had ever enjoyed popular appeal, this support was 
ever diminishing. Even the regime’s “Popular Defense Forces,” which 
carried out the war against the SPLA, were unpopular: they were ﬁlled 
with “thousands of unprepared high-school graduates [who] were force-
fully conscripted and thrown into war zones in the south” (p. 124). Nor 
was the religious vision of the movement, to the extent that it had one, 
inspiring to Muslim outsiders. Gallab suggests, instead, that in the face 
of state-sanctioned Islamism, Suﬁ and neo-Mahdist Muslim cultures 
thrived, making the Islamists look like a fringe group in power. Second, 
the Sudanese Islamist movement appears to have been a highly parochial 
movement. In recounting the movement’s history, its leaders insisted on 
both the autonomy and the autochthony of Sudanese Islamism. They 
denied that the movement was an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna, and suggested instead that it had 
emerged in Sudan as a parallel development. Given this emphatically 
Sudanese consciousness, it is unclear how much the Sudanese Islamist 
movement and the ﬁrst Islamist republic can tell us about global Sunni 
Islamism. Turabi may have liked to style himself as a global Islamist 
guru (for example, by trying to establish Khartoum as a regular venue 
for the “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference”), but the dynamics of the 
movement remained deeply rooted in local conditions.
Turabi steadily insisted on what the Sudan’s Islamist state was not. It 
was not, he claimed, secular, nationalistic, or absolutist. Perhaps Turabi’s 
greatest failure, in Gallab’s view, is that he never clariﬁed what an Islamic 
state in Sudan actually was or should be. Thus Gallab paints a portrait of 
an Islamist republic in which Islam, itself, was elusive. Questions linger. 
Is Islamism as a political ideology fully discredited as an approach to 
governing Sudan’s republic? Can a better, more ethically rigorous state 
Islamism take hold? If not, what ideological source of hope—what “ism” 
—will inspire Sudanese Muslim intellectuals in the future?
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